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❏	 How closely does the approach adopted by the judge at first instance (Mann, 
J) reflect your understanding of approaches to legal interpretation as 
outlined in Units A6 and B6? 
❏	 Is using ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’ meaning helpful as a starting point in deciding 
what a word means, if whatever is decided as that meaning will then be 
modified to fit the requirements of a piece of legislation being applied? 
❏	 How successful do you consider the multifactorial test for sculpture approved 
by the Supreme Court? Is using some such test essential if problems of ‘the 
elephant in the room test’ or the ‘What is Art?’ question are to be avoided? 
❏	 Finally, one school of legal theory, known as legal realism, has seriously 
queried the sorts of reasoning judges engage in. It suggests that such 
approaches to interpretation serve merely as a vehicle for decisions that are 
ultimately made on other grounds. Do you consider this to be a risk with 
the kinds of semantic argument put forward by the courts in interpreting a 
statutory word such as sculpture? 
Activity ✪ 
SPOKEN AND WRITTEN PERFORMATIVES 
In this unit, we look at how performative speech acts take place in three different 
mediums: in speech, in writing, and in electronic communication. We consider the 
history of performativity in changing linguistic and social relations brought about by 
the shift from orality to literacy, and speculate about challenges facing performatives 
that have accompanied the rise of electronic means of communication and increased 
frequency of legal transactions and interactions at a distance. 
Identifying legal speech acts 
Consider the following excerpt from the will made by the American actress Marilyn 
Monroe (1926–1962): 
Last Will and Testament of Marilyn Monroe 
I, MARILYN MONROE, do make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will and 
Testament. 
FIRST: I hereby revoke all former Wills and Codicils by me made.
 
SECOND: I direct my Executor, hereinafter named, to pay all of my just debts, funeral
 
expenses and testamentary charges as soon after my death as can conveniently be done.
 
THIRD: I direct that all succession, estate or inheritance taxes which may be levied 
against my estate and/or against any legacies and/or devises hereinafter set forth shall be 
paid out of my residuary estate. 
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✪ Activity
FOURTH: (a) I give and bequeath to BERNICE MIRACLE, should she survive me, the 
sum of $10,000.00. 
(b)	 I give and bequeath to MAY REIS, should she survive me, the sum of 
$10,000.00. 
(c)	 I give and bequeath to NORMAN and HEDDA ROSTEN, or to the survivor 
of them, or if they should both predecease me, then to their daughter, 
PATRICIA ROSTEN, the sum of $5,000.00, it being my wish that such sum 
be used for the education of PATRICIA ROSTEN. 
(d)	 I give and bequeath all of my personal effects and clothing to LEE 
STRASBERG, or if he should predecease me, then to my Executor hereinafter 
named, it being my desire that he distribute these, in his sole discretion, among 
my friends, colleagues and those to whom I am devoted. 
 
1	 Identify the explicit performative acts in this excerpt, and list the 
performative verbs that realise them. You should end up with a (fairly 
elaborate) representation based on repeated application of Searle’s formula 
F(p). 
2	 What kinds of linguistic expression guide you in identifying phrases or 
sentences that constitute performative acts? You might, for example, 
consider deictics such as personal pronouns (e.g. I), use of simple present 
tense, use of modality, use of temporal adverbs such as now, etc. 
3	 Only performative verbs, Austin suggests, co-occur with the adverb hereby 
between first-person subject and verb. Inserting hereby at appropriate points 
in sentences throughout the document accordingly gives you one test of 
whether your list of performative verbs fits or conflicts with Austin’s 
stipulation. 
4	 How much of the document is not performative in the sense you have 
followed in responding to the previous questions? This final question may 
expose difficulties in thinking about the scope of the content that falls 
within any given performative act. 
Conditions on the effectiveness of legal enactments 
Felicity conditions are requirements that need to be fulfilled for a speech act to 
achieve its conventional effect. With institutional speech acts, the kinds of condition 
in question may include whether procedural conventions are followed, whether the 
performative act is uttered by an appropriate person, in appropriate circumstances, 
and whether the act is completed without errors. Felicity conditions are usually 
understood implicitly. Searle’s descriptions show how detailed an analysis must be if 
it is to specify the intuitive felicity conditions that satisfy the requirements of a 
particular speech act, such as bequeath. 
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In a chapter on what he calls ‘reversible performatives’, Kurzon examines bequeath, 
which he describes as a ‘ceremonial performative’ (Kurzon 1986: 41–2). For legal speech 
acts, Kurzon emphasises, felicity conditions are not intuitive, but are explicitly laid down 
in the applicable law or laws. We can explore this statement further by staying with 
wills but changing jurisdiction: here are some selected provisions in the Wills Act 1837 
(UK, as amended). For some provisions, only a section heading is shown. 
7. No will of a person under age valid. 
9. 	 Signing and attestation of wills 
No will shall be valid unless – 
(a) 	 it is in writing, and signed by the testator, or by some other person in his 
presence and by his direction; and 
(b) 	 it appears that the testator intended by his signature to give effect to the will; 
and 
(c) 	 the signature is made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two 
or more witnesses present at the same time; and 
(d) 	 each witness either – 
(i) 	 attests and signs the will; or 
(ii) acknowledges his signature, in the presence of the testator (but not 
necessarily in the presence of any other witness) 
but no form of attestation shall be necessary. 
13. 	 Publication of will not be requisite. 
14. 	 Will not to be void on account of incompetency of attesting witness. 
17. 	 Executor shall be admitted a witness. 
18. 	 Wills to be revoked by marriage, except in certain cases. 
❏	 Following the exposition of Kurzon we give in Unit B7, describe how the 
sections above (none of which contains an explicit performative verb) 
function as performative acts. Remember to relate the provisions as a series 
to the effect of the enacting formula. 
❏	 If we apply Searle’s (1969) model, some of the conditions that a speaker – 
in this case, a testator – has to fulfil are that he or she: (i) has authority (or 
power) to bequeath; (ii) has something to bequeath; and (iii) intends the 
act to be an act of bequeathing. How closely do these general felicity 
conditions on the speech act match the more detailed legal provisions 
presented here? 
❏	 Felicity conditions for conversational speech acts tell us what a particular 
act is. In law, such conditions work differently. They still define the 
constitutive issue (what is a will?); but they combine that function with 
specifying particular aims and protecting interests. What for example do you 
think s. 9(b) seeks to prevent? And what do you think the general 
presumption is behind s. 18? 
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Performativity, orality and literacy 
Gibbons (2003) and other writers have pointed out that it is possible in some written 
legal documents to see traces of earlier, oral common-law traditions. One such trace 
is arguably use of clearly identifiable, first-person explicit performatives in documents 
such as wills. Such written performatives are fixed in permanent form but also 
convey the sense of a written ‘record’ of a situationally specific speech event (of a kind 
displaced by a shift of priority between the two mediums of speech and writing; 
Clanchy 1993). 
In her paper ‘Speech, writing and performativity: an evolutionary view of the history 
of constitutive ritual’, Brenda Danet (1997) traces this development. She examines what 
she sees as ‘one of the most prominent, universal features of language in all societies: 
providing recipes for the creation of new social relationships and social arrangements, 
and for transformations of the status of individuals or groups’ (Danet 1997: 13). The 
performative dimension of language and society, she argues, has a complex history 
running from verbal formulas in preliterate social rituals, through their development 
and adaptation in customary law, into more recent practices based on production, 
adoption and retention of written documents. 
Danet describes how constitutive ceremonies of this general kind, whether written 
or oral, are treated by members of society as legally binding, and how respect for 
obligations ratified by such means is typically embedded in a shifting combination of 
sacred and secular rituals. In illustrating such rituals, Danet also notes how linguistic 
stylisation is universally found in oral ritual genres of communication, and is sometimes 
carried over into the high, formal registers of more recent written legal styles (see 
unit B2). 
In the course of her paper, Danet refers to earlier research she had undertaken with 
Bryna Bogoch on the history of wills during the crucial period of the early rise of literacy 
in medieval England. Danet and Bogoch (1992) assemble a corpus of the complete set 
of 62 wills in Old English that survive from the Anglo-Saxon period. Taking a combined 
linguistic and anthropological approach, the authors analyse the language of 
constitutive ritual in this corpus, describing different linguistic features in three main 
categories they identified as being of interest: 
(i) meta-comments about writing; 
(ii) linguistic realisation of the performative act of ‘bequeathing’; and 
(iii) decontextualisation. 
They then compare their historical data with modern wills. Here are some rows 
adapted from one of their tables (Danet and Bogoch 1992: 99). 
Read the table and then consider the questions that follow. 
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Feature	 Anglo-Saxon wills Modern wills 
1 Meta-comments about Present Absent 
writing 
2 Realisation of the act 
of bequeathing 
Linked to oral ceremony Autonomous 
3 Opening strategy Non-standard Standard 
4 Witnesses Reference only, or 
touching the document 
Signature 
5 Direct address Present Absent 
6 Hedging Present Absent 
1	 What historical changes reported in the table suggest movement away from 
features of speech towards a written genre? Are there any changes that point 
in the opposite direction? 
2	 Row 1 of the table appears to suggest that while modern testators take the 
act of writing for granted, Anglo-Saxon wills show self-consciousness in 
using the new medium. Danet and Bogoch’s examples from their corpus 
include: 
(a) 	 I, Ealdorman Alfred, command to be written and made known in this 
document to King Alfred and all his councillors . . . 
(b) 	 Then I wish it to be given out for my soul just as I now said to my friends 
with whom I spoke . . . 
Explain in more detail how these two comments on writing and speaking 
might be thought to support an inference that wills underwent a transition 
during the period from earlier oral forms of social relationship into a 
recorded, literate legal culture. 
3	 In Danet and Bogoch’s corpus, wills often refer explicitly to an oral ceremony 
that constituted the binding act of bequeathing, in advance of the written 
document. Performative significance was nevertheless marked in some 
ceremonies by witnesses touching a cross on the document with a sword or 
a hand (touching the cross was a medieval equivalent of a modern signature). 
How reasonable is it for Danet to see a link between verbal and physical 
aspects of this performative act? 
4	 Danet’s inference is that the ritual reveals a transitional connection between 
physical manipulation of symbolic objects, common in oral ceremonies, and 
a new literacy, in that individuals are relating their movements to graphic 
marks on the parchment. How reasonable is this inference? 
5	 Finally, in their study Danet and Bogoch note the presence of an extra 
performative that has disappeared completely from modern wills. Over 
one-quarter of the wills in their corpus contain curses addressed to anyone 
who tampered with the will. Here is one example: 
Activity ✪ 
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And he who shall detract from my will which I have now declared in the 
witness of God, may he be deprived of joy on this earth, and may [. . .] he be 
delivered into the abyss of hell to Satan the devil and all his accursed 
companions and there suffer with God’s adversaries, without end, and never 
trouble my heirs. 
In light of your thinking in response to the questions above, what would 
you consider an appropriate explanation of the historical disappearance of 
this performative? 
Spoken and written contracts 
Danet’s arguments prompt fundamental questions about how legal performativity 
relates to linguistic medium. How effective, we might therefore ask, are explicit legal 
performatives in speech in the modern period of majority (though very uneven) 
literacy in most societies? 
Contracts offer an interesting illustration. It is commonly assumed, but wrongly, 
that contracts are only enforceable if they are made in writing. Several shifts exist, 
historically. Before widespread literacy, in oral legal culture, spoken contracts and 
associated rituals were the norm (and remain so in many societies). With the rise of 
literacy, a gradual shift took place towards more frequent use of, and greater status 
accorded to, written documents, including contracts. Seventeenth-century English law 
required a large number of contracts to be made in writing (Baker 2002: 348–50). 
Today, the law generally only insists on writing where the subject matter or nature of 
a contract requires certain evidence, or where a cautionary element is introduced to 
impress on one of the parties the seriousness of the agreement being entered into (hence 
a requirement of writing consumer credit agreements, sales of an interest in land, and 
distance selling agreements). 
There is still a tension in the mix of recorded written and unrecorded oral contracts, 
however. If a written contract was required every time someone bought a bottle of milk 
or loaf of bread, they would need to countersign an invoice; this would obstruct the 
multiplicity of transactions in modern everyday life. In most commercial dealings, 
written evidence is normally available in the form of electronically produced sales 
receipts, invoices and orders, but these are mostly not a legal requirement. In recent 
years, however, there has been a resurgence in what are called formality requirements 
(i.e. requirements of a particular form to make a contract enforceable; failure to 
comply can make a contract void, ineffective or without the consequences that should 
normally follow). This shift reflects a changing commercial environment and increased 
protection measures put in place for consumers. 
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Performativity, now and in the future 
Towards the end of the article discussed above, Danet turns from the advent of literacy 
to the recent rapid expansion of the online world, in order to address a further 
question: if a shift from orality to literacy prompted fundamental change in how 
performativity is achieved, is an equivalent transition now likely because of our current 
shift towards new kinds of mediated orality? 
Two central insights organise Danet’s discussion. One is her scepticism about the 
conventional wisdom that the prime incentive for the invention of writing was a need 
for record-keeping. She does not dispute the importance of record-keeping, but claims 
that her study with Bogoch shows how far preoccupation with the referential function 
of language can lead to overlooking the cultural importance of performativity. Her other 
main insight is that (as she highlights in claiming that the language of Anglo-Saxon wills 
was more context-dependent than modern wills) the historical development of written 
communication has been away from a presumption that other people will know who 
or what is meant on the basis of shared knowledge among members of a community. 
In discussing the anthropological significance of decoupling the verbal content of 
documents from face-to-face ceremonies, Danet weighs up the possibility that, in 
future, video-recorded oral ceremonies and eventually fully virtual events may replace 
performative documents, in the way that documents took over from oral rituals. She 
draws attention to current developments, including legally binding electronic signatures 
and other technical and legal means to guarantee the authenticity and binding quality 
of virtual ceremonies. She even speculates about the form of video wills. 
In our period of rapidly changing technological capabilities and international 
connectedness, a number of open-ended questions arise: 
1 What factors (technological, economic, linguistic, legal) would you expect 
to be taken into account in developments in this area? 
2 To what extent do new media of electronic transmission and dissemination 
of texts threaten our notion of the authoritative, binding document? 
3 How far will mediated forms of orality encourage new techniques of 
impersonation and fraud, potentially undermining levels of trust in rapidly 
changing societies? 
4 What will the effects of such new media be on the document-based legal 
culture mostly discussed in this book? Is it plausible, for example, to 
anticipate trials taking place completely in virtual courtrooms by means of 
synchronous electronic interaction? International treaties negotiated and 
signed without the signatories ever meeting, let alone signing? 
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